A Ātman, Hinduism Arpita Mitra Fellow, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, India Synonyms Ātmā; self; Self; Soul Definition The way ātman is predominantly understood in Hindu spirituality is derived from the Upaniṣads. It is an ontological principle that represents the human "essence" at the microcosmic level, the true and everlasting being in a living person, the true human self, distinct from the body and identical with the cosmic principle brahman. While the body dies and is subject to pain and pleasure, the ātman is immortal and unaffected by pain, pleasure, etc. Introduction The concept of the ātman is perhaps the crest jewel of Hindu spiritual philosophy. This concept occupies such an important place in Hindu theology that being a Hindu is almost synonymous with believing in the doctrine of the ātman. Belief in this doctrine in fact constitutes the cornerstone of difference between Hinduism and nāstika schools of thought such as Buddhism or Cārvāka. The concept of the atman as we understand it today was articulated in the Upaniṣads. The discourse on the self was immortalized in the famous dialogues between Yājñavalkya and others (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad), Āruṇi and Śvetaketu (Chāndogya Upaniṣad), Prajāpati and Indra (Chāndogya Upaniṣad), and Yama and Naciketā (Kaṭha Upaniṣad). However, it has a prehistory in the Saṅhitā and Brāhmaṇa portions of the Vedas. The first section of this essay will trace that history briefly. The second section examines the meaning of ātman as used in theUpaniṣads, qualities of the ātman, the locus of the ātman, the discourse on knowing the ātman, and the issue of the brahmanātman identity. Subsequent to the Upaniṣads, the six systems of Hindu philosophy each conceived of the self in a particular way. Others, such as the Buddhists or the Cārvākas, denied the way ātman was defined and accepted within Hinduism. The last section deals briefly with the position of the six āstika schools and the Buddhists and Cārvākas regarding the ātman. The Pre-Upanisadic Evolution of the Concept It is well-known that the speculations on the ātman began long before the Upanisadic portions of the Vedas were composed. However, there are # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2018 P. Jain et al. (eds.), Hinduism and Tribal Religions, Encyclopedia of Indian Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1036-5_172-1 variations between the pre-Upanisadic and the Upanisadic usage of the term. The Vedic and the Brahmanic usages lack sharply defined contours and are often found in a state of flux of meanings. However, once in a while, a few sudden remarks are also found that at least match with the direction in which the concept of ātman was to later develop in the Upaniṣads. According to Louis Renou, since the Ṛgveda, the word ātman denotes "something which is at the base of the 'animated' character of living beings. . ." ([4], p. 151). In the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā, the word ātmanvant means "animated." It designates all beings endowed with life. It is also used as an epithet to yakṣa to denote the "animated mystery" that resides in the body or in the heart of man ([4], p. 153). From an etymological point of view, ātman is often explained as "breath," drawing especially from the similarity with German terms like "atmen," meaning "to breathe." However, Renou warns against such an etymological derivation of usage that could be deceptive. He concedes that the "most immediately accessible use of ātman is that one which connects the term with the wind on the cosmic plane; the Aśvins cross the space ātmeva vātah. . . 'like the wind (which is the correlative of) ātman'. . ." ([4], p. 151). However, Renou is critical of equating ātman with breath based on the later correspondence between prāṇa and vāta. According to him, the correlation between ātman and vāta is secondary and would virtually disappear after the Ṛgveda Saṅhitā and that it expressed only rough approximations that would be substituted by concrete ideas of the constituent elements of being. In the Atharvaveda, not only does the correlation of ātman and wind or breath disappear, but in fact, ātman is presented as distinct from breath. Another possible meaning of ātman as "essence" is perhaps expressed when in the older part of the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā, it is said of Varuṇa "the wind which is thy ātman." Later, it is also said, for instance, of Soma that he is the ātman of the sacrifice, thus expressing a more general connotation. According to Renou, in the later part of the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā, the ātman at times represents a kind of elementary substance and comes near to the notion of "person." Renou notes new contrasts that are posited to the ātman in the Atharvaveda, for example, with indriya (sense organs) and especially with tanu (body). More significantly, here ātman in the sense of the "person" is now being distinguished from external entities, such as "father, son, wife," "children" or "cattle," "cows," etc. New connections are also introduced, for instance, with antarikṣa (in the Upaniṣads, this will evolve into its connection with the more subtle ākāśa). Renou also notes, citing Paul Deussen, that suddenly in a verse appears "an upaniṣadic accent": "free from desire, wise, immortal, self-existent, satisfied with sap, not deficient in any respect – knowing that wise, unaging, young atman, one is not afraid of death" ([4], p. 153). While the Brāhmaṇas inherit these meanings, they especially develop the use of ātman as a reflexive pronoun. They also use the word as meaning body. According to Renou, ātman "in the Brāhmaṇas is not at all unitary or simple notion. It is not the body, nor the person, nor the soul, nor the breath, but something participating in all these elements" ([4], p. 156). Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa X.6.3.2 recounts the teachings of Śāndilya: we are called to meditate upon the ātman as, among other things, "made up of intelligence," "with a form of light," "ethereal in nature," "swift as thought," "this golden puruṣa in the heart," "greater than the sky, greater than the earth. . .greater than all existing things." Renou points out that "only the identification with the brahman is missing. . .or at the most it is implied," whereas this identification will be explicitly declared in Chāndogya Upaniṣad III.14.4 where the same teachings by Śāndilya are resumed and amplified ([4], p. 156). Ātman in the Upanis   ads Meaning of Ātman In ancient India, the quest for a fundamental principle in the universe took a turn inward – into the inner life of human beings. In contrast to the earlier part of the Vedas, where the focus was 2 Ātman, Hinduism more on rituals, Upanisadic thought was predominantly occupied with the idea of the self. The great idea expressed in the Upaniṣads is that of the identity of the fundamental cosmic principle, brahman, and its microcosmic counterpart, ātman (although some later schools of Hindu thought do not accept an absolute identity between the two, see third section below). Renou argues that while ātman and brahman were seldom associated together before the Upaniṣads, the discovery of this identity between ātman and the cosmic principle catapulted the concept of ātman to unprecedented heights. The correlation between brahman and ātman is discussed in later sections of the essay. For the time being, it may be noted that the predominant meaning of ātman as used in the Upaniṣads is that of an ontological principle that represented the human "essence" at the microcosmic level, the true and everlasting being in a living person, the true human self, distinct from the body, and identical with the cosmic principle. The distinction of the ātman from the body is something to be noted. We already saw that in the pre-Upanisadic literature, ātman was being used in opposition to the body and again at times, also as synonymous with the body. In the Upaniṣads, ātman is understood as distinct and in some senses the opposite of all matter, including the body. The characteristic of matter is that it is perishable, whereas ātman is by its very nature immortal. Matter is insentient; ātman is of the nature of consciousness. Body is material, and so is the mind, in the Upanisadic framework. In fact, the mind is referred to as subtle body. Body and mind are subject to decay and are insentient. It is important to note that in theUpaniṣads, mind by itself is insentient; it can act only because of the ātman which is consciousness behind it. The distinction between mind and ātman is also to be noted. This, however, should not be taken to mean that the Upaniṣads preach about a transcendent self only. This self which is transcendent is also immanent in that it is the substance of which the universe is made. More of this will be elaborated in the course of the essay. There is, however, another point to be noted. One may bring up the issue of verses II.1.1-5.1 from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad where a particular process of progressive reflection is taking place revolving around the concept of "ātmā." In these verses, it is first stated that humans are the product of the essence of food; hence, food (anna) is the self (ātmā). Subsequently, it is said that there is another inner self – the vital force or breath (prāṇa). Thereafter, it is declared that there is yet another inner self – the mind (manas). Then it is said that right knowledge (vijñāna) constitutes the self that is even interior to the mind. Finally, it is stated that the yet inner self to vijñāna is bliss (ānanda). The Upanisadic verses in question use the word "ātmā," meaning self, for each of these layers of annamaya, prāṇamaya, manomaya, vijñānamaya, and ānandamaya. In his commentary, Śaṃkara used the term "kośa" instead of "ātmā" to distinguish these layers from the ātman, the real self. Hence, today, this idea is popularly known as the concept of the pañca kośa. It can be said that these verses present their teaching in such a way that it demands the direct involvement of a pupil in a progression of knowledge from a proposition to a better proposition. If one is asked to think of one's self, one is likely to think of one's body (annamaya) at first, and subsequently, upon reflection, find that there is something deeper and subtler that appears to be the self. It is thus that one progresses toward knowledge. Hence, it can be argued that when Taittirīya Upaniṣad II.1.1-5.1 refer to the annamaya, prāṇamaya, manomaya, etc., ātmās, they do not indicate the ātman but our ordinary sense of selfhood; and the objective of these verses is to push the seeker into a deeper probe, pointing toward the more and more subtle. Qualities of the Ātman It is difficult to speak of the ātman in terms of its qualities, because, by its very nature, it is without attributes. However, the Upaniṣads do speak about certain characteristics of the ātman by virtue of which it is possible to distinguish the self from all that is not the self, for example, the body. The most fundamental characteristic of the ātman is its immortality. It is neither born nor does it die; it is unborn, constant, eternal, and primeval; it is not killed even when the body is killed (Kaṭha Upaniṣad II.18). It knows no old age or decay (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VIII.1.5, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Ātman, Hinduism 3 Upaniṣad III.5.1, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.5.15). It is everlasting because it is not the effect of any cause; hence it is unconditioned. It does not originate from anything (Kaṭha Upaniṣad II.18); it is self-existent. The ātman is pure and effulgent (Munḍaka Upaniṣad III.1.5) and free from all evils (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VIII.1.5). It is beyond hunger, thirst, pain, sorrow, and delusion (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VIII.1.5, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad III.5.1, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.5.15). It is unattached and unfettered (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.5.15). The self is subtler than the subtle and greater than the great (Kaṭha Upaniṣad II.20). It is at once smaller than a grain of rice or barley, than a mustard seed, millet grain, or millet kernel but larger than the earth, the intermediate region, the sky, and all the worlds put together (Chāndogya Upaniṣad III.14.3). This self is omniscient and all-knowing (Munḍaka Upaniṣad II.2.7). It is of the nature of bliss (ānandarūpam) (Munḍaka Upaniṣad II.2.7). The Seat of the Ātman But where is the ātman located? It has entered into the bodies up to the tip of the nails (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.7) and resides there (Munḍaka Upaniṣad III.1.5). The ātman within the body is homologous to a razor in a case (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.7). Just as fire which sustains the world is at its source, similarly ātman is at the source of the body (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.7). This self is antarataram – innermost (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.8); it is within all (eṣa ta ātmā sarvāntarah) (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad III.5.1). However, one can say that its special place of "hiding" is the human heart (not the physical organ). One finds in the Upaniṣads statements like: the ātman lies deep within one's heart (antarhṛdaye) (Chāndogya Upaniṣad III.14.3-4); it lies hidden in the heart of every being (nihito guhāyām) (Kaṭha Upaniṣad II.20). In these contexts, guhā (cave) in the Upaniṣads is used as synonymous with the cave of the heart (hṛdaya). The word guhā has the added import of depth as well as concealment and points toward the hidden aspect of the ātman. Why was this need to emphasize the hidden nature of ātman? Is it then not possible to know the ātman? Before moving on to the issue of knowing the ātman, one brief remark needs to be made about the heart as the special locus of the ātman. The ātman is not merely lodged in the cavity of the heart, but it is also the place where it is most suitable to perceive it. This objection may be (and was perhaps) raised that if the ātman is omnipresent in the body, then how could any one place be its special locus? Śaṃkara's Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya I.2.11 answers that there is no contradiction between teaching about any one place as the locus for realizing the self and the fact of its omnipresence. Knowing the Ātman One of the fundamental points of investigation of the Upanisadic seers was: What is that, knowing which one knows all? Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.1.4 brings up the analogy of knowing all that is made of clay by virtue of knowing a lump of clay; and Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.1.5-6 repeats the same point by using the analogies of gold and objects made of gold and a (iron) nail cutter and all other iron objects. In all these verses, Uddālaka Āruṇi's refrain to his son Śvetaketu is that all transformation (vikāra) is name (nāma) only; the reality in these three cases are clay, gold, and iron respectively. In other words, names and forms are ever changing; but the substance is the same; it is constant; therefore, it is the only reality (satyam). Knowing the unchanging substance alone makes known all the changing forms made of that substance. Then how to know this substance of which all is made? The Upaniṣads immediately present a challenge: the fact that the ātman is imperceptible (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.5.15). Nobody can see the ātman (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.7). When it is viewed, it is seen only in its aspects, performing certain functions (like speaking, seeing, etc.); therefore, all such vision is incomplete. It cannot be seen in its totality. Why? The answer to this is related to the other great question of the Upaniṣads: How to know the Knower (vijñātāramare kena vijānīyāt)? Clarifying his preceding statement that after realizing the 4 Ātman, Hinduism oneness of existence, one loses consciousness (saṃjñā), Yājñavalkya says that one smells, sees, hears, speaks, thinks, or knows something when there is duality, when oneness is realized what should one smell and through what, what should one see and through what, etc., "through what should one know That owing to which all this is known – through what, O Maitreyī, should one know the Knower?" (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II.4.14). Yājñavalkya more or less repeats this (with some additional statements) to Maitreyī before he leaves home as a renunciate (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.5.15). All knowledge presupposes a split between the subject and object of knowledge, where the knower is the subject and the known the object. But brahman/ātman is not an object of knowledge, like a table or a chair. It is, on the contrary, through the self that the table and the chair are known. It is through the self that all is known (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.7); therefore, the self is the eternal subject of all knowledge. And the knower can never know himself – at least, not in the same way as one knows a table or a chair. To use a Vedantic analogy – it is on account of the eyes that we see the world, but the eyes cannot see themselves; while the fact that we see is proof that the eyes exist! As Yājñavalkya put it to Uṣasta: one cannot see that which is the witness of the seeing, one cannot hear that which is the hearer of hearing, think that which is the thinker of thought, know that which is the knower of knowledge – this is the self that is within all (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad III.4.2). In other words, the ātman cannot be known through the senses, the mind, or the intellect. The self-existent one (svayambhu) made the senses outgoing; that is why one sees the outer objects but not the inner self (antarātman); a certain wise man (dhīrah) desiring immortality turns his sight inwards and sees the self within (Kaṭha Upaniṣad IV.1). A desireless man perceives the glory of the self (Kaṭha Upaniṣad II.20). Desires make the mind go outward, making it chase objects in the external world; hence, on account of desires, one fails to withdraw the mind within, which is a precondition for the perception of the ātman. This effulgent and pure self within the body is attainable through the constant practice of truth, austerity, complete knowledge (about the true nature of the self), and continence (Munḍaka Upaniṣad III.1.5). Kaṭha Upaniṣad II.23 adds another dimension: the self cannot be attained through study, intellection, or hearing; it can be known only through the self to which the seeker prays; it is known when the self reveals it true nature. And the result of perceiving the self is cessation of grief – perceiving this self as bodiless within bodies, as unchanging in the midst of the changing, as great and all-pervading, the wise man (dhīrah) does not grieve (Kaṭha Upaniṣad II.22). The unknowability of the ātman as an object is perhaps the reason why instruction about it is usually cryptic; it is spoken of obliquely with the help of referents, as it cannot be objectified (as is the case in Yājñavalkya's dialogues in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad or the conversation between Āruṇi and Śvetaketu in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad). Moreover, the aspirant is also required to intuit or perceive the ātman himself (as shown in the Indra-Prajāpati episode in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad). A precondition for this perception is the preparation of the mind through purification. Brahman and Ātman The identity of the macrocosmic principle brahman and its microcosmic counterpart ātman is stated in many an Upanisadic verse. For example, Chāndogya Upaniṣad III.14.4, which amplifies Śāndilya's teachings as we found in Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa X.6.3.2, states that "this ātman of mine within the heart. . .is Brahman. . ." In Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad III.5.1, Kahola asks Yājñavalkya to explain that ātman within all which is the most evident and direct brahman (sākṣādaparokṣādbrahma). In a similar vein, Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad II.15 states that when one realizes the reality of brahman as the very reality of ātman, one becomes free from all bondages. Secondly, the qualities that are attributed to ātman are the same qualities that are attributed to brahman. For example, brahman is the ātman that has no sin, no decrepitude, no death, no sorrow, no hunger, and no thirst (Chāndogya Upaniṣad Ātman, Hinduism 5 VIII.1.5). Brahman is great and self-effulgent; it is subtler than the subtle, farther than the far-off yet near at hand (Munḍaka Upaniṣad III. 1. 7). Brahman after having created (the universe) entered into that very thing; it became the formed and the formless, the sentient and the insentient, etc. (Taittirīya Upaniṣad II.6.1). While it is immanent, it is to be found especially within the cave of the heart (nihitam guhāyām) (Munḍaka Upaniṣad III. 1. 7). The brahman-ātman is the knower, the eternal subject of all knowledge, that can never be the object of knowledge, yet it is through this that everything else is known. Keṇa Upaniṣad I.2 describes brahman as the ear of the ear, mind of the mind, speech of the speech, eye of the eye, etc., that is, brahman is that on account of which knowledge itself is possible. Keṇa Upaniṣad I.4 cites the ancient people saying that brahman is indeed different from the known and above the unknown. In other words, it is neither known nor unknown, because anything that is known is limited, on the other hand, brahman being unknown would make knowledge itself an impossibility, as it is through brahman that we know, brahman is the real knower. Brahman cannot be uttered by speech, comprehended by the mind, seen with the eyes, and so on (Keṇa Upaniṣad I.5-9). Munḍaka Upaniṣad III.1.8 repeats that brahman cannot be grasped through the eyes, speech, and other senses; the indivisible brahman can only be perceived by the one, engaged in meditation, whose mind has become pure and whose intellect is favorable (by being transparent and tranquil, explains Śaṃkara in his commentary). The greatest statement of the identity of the macrocosmic brahman and the microcosmic ātman is perhaps "tat tvam asi" that appears as a refrain in the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. It is one of the Upanisadicmahāvākyas (great sayings) and is generally accepted to mean "you are that," where "that" (tat) refers to pure being or brahman. However, there is some debate regarding it that should be mentioned. While the Advaita "school" of Vedānta deduces absolute identity between the two on the basis of this statement, the Dvaita thinkers (see below), for instance, question this interpretation and offer their own alternative meanings like "you are like that," "you are (attached) to that," "you are dependent on that," "you are of the nature of that," and so on, mainly invoking grammatical grounds ([1], p. 109). On the other hand, modern scholars too invoke a different interpretation on grammatical grounds. According to Joel Brereton, for instance, contextually as well as syntactically, it is not convincing that tad stands for sat, that is, being. He would rather translate "tat tvam asi" as "in that way are you. . ." [1]. Patrick Olivelle agrees with Brereton and prefers to translate "tat tvam asi" as "that's how you are" ([3], p. 560). On the other hand, there are scholars who would give philosophical coherence precedence over grammatical rules (see discussion in [2], pp. 32–33, fn. 16). While, there could be debates – mainly grammatical as they appear – on the meaning of this famous mahāvākya, the other verses cited above show other instances where brahman-ātman identity is established, at times even quite explicitly. Ātman According to Different Schools of Thought The Āstika Schools of Thought The six schools of Hindu philosophy (darśana) – Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika – that developed mostly after the Upaniṣads are āstika, in that they accept the authority of the Vedas. However, drawing from the same source Upaniṣads, they vary in their conceptualization of the self. There are several schools within Vedanta, most prominent among which are the three – Advaita (non-dualism), Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified nondualism), and Dvaita (dualism). There are several philosophers within each of these schools, and the history of development of the ideas of each school is long drawn. Here we shall discuss only some representative ideas. These three mainly differ in their ideas about the relationship between brahman and the ātman. The Advaitin Śaṃkara, for instance, explains it thus: he uses the word jīva to denote the individual self which is a subjectobject complex. "Its subject-element is Pure Consciousness and is called the Sākṣin [witness]. Its object-element is the internal organ called the 6 Ātman, Hinduism antahkaraṇa [the inner instrument of cognition, consisting of manas, buddhi etc.] which is bhautika as it is composed of all the five elements. . ." ([5], p. 252). The former, that is, the pure self (which is consciousness and Sākṣin) is Brahman, and this identity is realized in liberation. Rāmānuja, the most prominent name in the Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition, on the other hand, proposes the philosophy of non-dualism qualified by difference. To put it briefly, for him "Unity means realization of being a vital member of [the] organic whole. God or the Absolute is this whole. He is the immanent controller...God is the soul of nature. God is also the soul of souls. Our souls are souls in relation to our bodies, but in relation to God, they become His body and He is their soul. The relation between the soul and the body is that of inner separability. . ." ([5], p. 346). On the other hand, Madhva, the dualist, accepts many of Rāmānuja's ideas, but his views are divergent on many fundamental counts. For him, difference is so great a fact that he advocates five kinds of differences – that between soul and God, between soul and soul, between soul and matter, between God and matter, and finally, between matter and matter. For Madhva, God is the repository of infinitely good qualities; He is the creator, preserver, and destroyer; He is transcendent, as well as immanent as the inner controller; the human soul is by nature conscious and blissful but is subject to pain and imperfections on account of its association with the body, sense organs, minds, etc. Madhva accepts Rāmānuja's distinction between matter, soul, and God but rejects his view that the differences between these three have no separate existence but are mere qualifications of identity. According to Madhva, matter, souls, and God are three distinct entities, and their differences constitute their unique natures, respectively [5]. The other schools too have variations within themselves, but here we shall consider only some representative views. Among the Mīmāṃsakas, Kumārila holds that "the self is of the nature of pure consciousness and is illumined by itself" ([6], p. 236). Some scholars disagree with this view, while some others uphold it (for details, see [6], p. 236). Sāṃkhya philosophy, on the other hand, rejects the idea of a single absolute self and instead postulates the existence of a plurality of individual souls. It postulates two co-present co-eternal realities – puruṣa and prakṛti. Puruṣa is the soul, the self, and the spirit; it is pure consciousness, distinct from the body, sense organs, etc. However, there are numerous puruṣas; as many individuals, so many are puruṣas as their souls or real selves. Prakṛti is the uncaused root cause of the universe. (One may doubt if Sāṃkhya can be regarded as consistent with the teachings of the Upaniṣads. Despite evident differences between the teachings of the Upaniṣads and those of Sāṃkhya, the issue is intricate and cannot be resolved unequivocally. See [5], p. 149, p. 31.) According to Sāṃkhya, the self is an object of inference and "can be inferred from its reflection (pratibimba) in buddhi as its original (bimba)" ([6], p. 260). The perception of the self is an impossibility, because of the split between puruṣa and prakṛti. According to Pātañjala Yoga, however, the self can be perceived through higher intuition, but this perception is like the pure self, the subject, intuiting itself through its reflection, the empirical self or the object, in buddhi. Vaiśeṣikas like Kaṇāda hold that the pure self can be perceived but not as an object of ordinary perception; it cannot be perceived through the manas. But it can be perceived by higher intuition – a particular kind of conjunction between the self and manas, and this conjunction occurs as a result of a particular power (dharma) born of meditation [6]. For the Naiyāyika, the self is a permanent substance, a substratum to qualities like cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort. All Naiyāyikas agree that the self is an object of inference; it can be inferred from its qualities as their substratum. Generally speaking, the Naiyāyikas do not believe that the self can be perceived as it cannot be both "subject and object of the same act of knowledge" ([6], p. 259). But some Naiyāyikas hold that it is the object of perception as well; however, this perception is a special kind of perception (akin to what the Vaiśeṣikas hold). Ātman, Hinduism 7 The Nāstika Schools of Thought A prominent critic of the Vedantic notion of the self is Buddhism. They deny the existence of any self as the āstika schools would understand it. According to the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism, the true nature of things is empty of an intrinsic essence (śūnya). While the most common approach to interpreting this śūnyavāda is to consider it as a doctrine of void or emptiness, counter views to this also exist. Chandradhar Sharma, for example, holds that śūnya does not mean "empty void" but "indescribable" as it is beyond the four categories of the intellect ([5], pp. 86–87). The Yogācāra Buddhists go one step further and say that the self is nothing but a stream of constantly changing consciousness lacking in any core substance. The Yogācāras, therefore, hold that the self is but a series of cognitions, where these cognitions alone are ultimately real, and there is no self apart from these cognitions. Sadānanda, the author of Vedāntasāra, speaks of four kinds of Cārvākas: (1) those who identify the self with the gross body, (2) those who identify it with the external sense organs, (3) the ones who identify the self with the vital force, and (4) those who equate the self with the mind (Vedāntasāra III.124-27). Some also identify the self with the sons or dear ones (Vedāntasāra III.123). Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says that the Cārvākas regard "consciousness as a by-product of unconscious elements, e.g., earth, water, fire, and air." ([6], p. 223) Hence, the Cārvākas do not hold the self to be an independent, self-existent, conscious entity, as do the Upaniṣads. Therefore, the Cārvākas believe that the ātman as the Upaniṣads understand it does not exist at all; it can neither be perceived through the sense organs or the mind nor inferred (inference is not a means of valid knowledge according to Cārvākas; however, they find no mark of inference either) [6]. Cross-References ▶Advaita Vedānta ▶Ākāśa ▶Āstika ▶Atharva Veda ▶Brahman ▶Brāhmaṇas ▶Cārvāka ▶Darśana, Overview of Six Schools ▶Death, Hinduism ▶Dvaita Vedānta ▶ Jīva ▶Madhva ▶Mahāvākya ▶Manas ▶Meditation (Hinduism) ▶Mīmāṃsāas Introspective Literature and as Philosophy ▶Nāstika ▶Nyāya (and Navya-Nyāya) ▶ Prakṛti ▶ Puruṣa ▶Rāmānuja ▶ṚgVeda ▶ Sāṃkhya ▶ Śaṅkara (Śaṃkara) ▶ Śarīra (body) ▶ Sat ▶ Satya ▶Upaniṣads ▶Vaiśeṣika ▶Vedānta, Overview ▶Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta ▶Yoga, Overview References 1. Brereton JP (1986) "Tat Tvam Asi" in context. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 136(1):98–109 2. Ganeri J (2007) The concealed art of the soul: theories of self and practices of truth in Indian ethics and epistemology. Oxford University Press, New York 3. Olivelle P (ed & trans) (1998) The early Upaniṣads: annotated text and translation. Oxford University Press, New York 4. Renou L (1952) On the word ātman. Vak 2:151–157 5. Sharma C (1987) A critical survey of Indian philosophy. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 6. Sinha J (1958) Indian psychology. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 8 Ātman, Hinduism